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RECENT DECISIONS
Duty of Union to Bargain in Good Faith-The Court of Ap-
peals of Columbia, faced with a factual situation which found a
union engaging in harassing tactics involving refusal to work
overtime, extended rest periods, slowdowns, and unannounced
walkouts while bargaining with an employer, concluded that noth-
ing in the LMRA outlawed such union conduct. The Court also
found that such conduct did not constitute a failure to bargain
in good faith.'
Since the specific activities in which the union was engaging
were not prescribed in the LMRA, the Court said that it had no
jurisdiction. In answer to the contention that Sec. 8(b)(3)2 and
8(d)3 applied in this situation the Court rejoined that:
"There is not the slightest inconsistency between genuine
desire to come to an agreement and use of economic pressure
to get the kind of agreement one wants. . . . As the Board
intimated, the Union might have called a strike; no inference
of failure to bargain in good faith could have been drawn
from a total withholding of services during negotiations, in
order to put economic pressure on the employer to yield
to the Union's demands. As a simple matter of fact, it is
equally clear that no such inference can be drawn from a
partial withholding of services at that time for that pur-
pose." 4
A vigorous dissent, directed at the majority's attitude on good
faith bargaining was written by Judge Danaher.
"The Board here has not asserted that the 'tactics'
constitute a violation of federal law. It has said that such
conduct taken into account with all other factors 'on the
entire record' justified a finding of failure to bargain in good
faith. Surely it is within the competence and one of the
functions of the Board to inquire into and to decide prob-
lems arising from Section 8(d)5 of the act."
It appears that the dissenter's viewpoint was correct in the
instant case. It seems from a study of legislative history and
the wording of Sec. 8(d) that the duty of the union to bargain is
equivalent to that of the employer. 6 Although there are not many
1Textile Workers Union, CIO v. N.L.R.B., 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
This decision again become current by virtue of the U.S. Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari in N.L.R.B. v. Textile Workers Union of America, CIO,
77 S. Ct. 90 (1956).
2 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§158(b)(3) (1952).
Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§158(d) (1952).
4 227 F.2d at 410.
s Id. at 412.
G See The Duty of a Labor Union to Barqain Collectively in Good Faith-An
Unresolved Problem, 25 FORD L. REV. 319, at 324 (1956).
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cases spelling out the union's responsibility to bargain, the basic
philosophy enunciated in discussion of the duty of employers seems
applicable.
The Seventh Circuit stressed as a yardstick for good faith col-
lective bargaining a totality of conduct test which requires that
all facts be closely scrutinized. 7 The Truitt case" restated this point.
In this case the Court held that the employer was required to
produce information about its financial status when inability to pay
increased wages was an issue. Here the Court stated:
"We do not hold, however, that in every case in which
economic inability is raised as an argument against increased
wages it automatically follows that the employees are en-
titled to substantiating evidence. Each case must turn upon
its particular facts. The inquiry must always be whether or
not under the circumstances of the particular case the sta-
tutory obligation to bargain in good faith has been met."0
Applying a totality of conduct test to Textile Workers0 it
appears that the action taken by the union in engaging in deliber-
ate acts of harassment is not in harmony with any ordinary con-
cept of good faith bargaining. Although pretending to bargain,
as a practical matter the union has actually withdrawn itself from
the bargaining table because it is no longer properly. using per-
suasive reasoning but is attempting to force the issue through
various physical pressures. Surely these are not the tactics which
are employed by a good faith bargainer. True there may be the
appearance that the union is presenting logical argument, but
because of its harassing acts it would seem as a realistic matter
that the presentation of the union would make no impression on
the employer.
This thinking is supported by the view of Edward Peters,
Conciliator of California State Conciliation as outlined in his
recent publication." In the chapter discussing the element of
good faith collective bargaining he proposes:
"Standards of fair play cannot be based on conflicting
social outlooks and philosophies. The one basic criterion of
good faith, recognized and accepted by the parties, is con-
tained in the iron rule: Preserve the sanctity of your lines
of communication.'
2
There is no realistic communication when one party at the
7Singer Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 119 F. 2d 131 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 595 (1941).
s N.L.R.B. v. Truit Mfg. Co., 224 F.2d 869, reversed 76 S. Ct. 753 (1956).
076 S.Ct. at 756 (4th Cir. 1955).
10 See note 1 supra.
"1 See Edward Peters, Strategy and Tactics in Labor Negotiations (1955).
1Id. at 222.
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bargaining table treats the other unfairly. The same thought has
been expressed in a similar manner by Robert D. Leiter in the
Labor Law Journal1 3 where he observed:
"The N.L.R.B. has held that if a union is engaged in an
activity which is not consistent with the act, it does not meet
the test of bargaining in good faith; such bargaining requires
reasoned decisions and balanced relations. It noted that good
faith at the bargaining table is generally a relative matter
and that the lack of good faith in one party may remove the
possibility of negotiation and preclude the existence of a
situation in which the other parties good faith can be tested."
The majority of course, see no distinction between the facts
here involved and those that exist when a strike is in progress.
The distinction, however, appears to be this. Since many strikes
are valid, economic expediency requires that the parties bargain
in an effort to resolve differences. Under the circumstances here
involved, economic expediency does not control and since the union
has moved itself outside the periphery of good faith bargaining,
the employer can take the position that he will not continue to
bargain until the union stops its harassing tactics or goes out on
a true strike. No valid strike was employed by the union in the
Textile Workers case.14 It is submitted, that recognizing the afore-
mentioned difference between harassing tactics and a valid strike,
such union conduct should have been enjoined as bad faith col-
lective bargaining.
RICHARD GLEN GREENWOOD
Real Estate Broker: Entitlement to Commission After Buyer
Defaults Purchase Contract-Defendants gave plaintiff a standard
broker's listing on their property for $15,900. Three days later,
plaintiff secured an unconditional offer of $15,000 from prospective
buyers, which the defendant-sellers accepted, agreeing to close the
transaction in three months. When the parties met for the closing,
buyers were informed of a judgment docketed against one of the
defendants in the amount of $700. Plaintiff's attorney suggested
an escrow arrangement to cover this amount. The purchasers re-
fused to close under such circumstances and promptly departed.
Plaintiff, unable to induce the parties to close subsequently, de-
manded its commission from the defendants, who refused. Plain-
tiff brought action on its listing agreement in the Civil Court of
Milwaukee County. From a judgment for the defendant, plaintiff
appealed to the Circuit Court. From an order of the Circuit Court
13See Leiter, The Meaning of Collective Bargaining 6 LAB. L. J. 835 (Dec.
1955).
14 See note 1 supra.
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